About the author:
The US Ramps Up the Asia-Pacific Minilateral Mechanism.
The minilateral mechanism is an important initiative taken by the US to rebuild the First Island Chain and the "Three-Sea Linkage" alliance strategy involving the East China Sea, the South China Sea, and the Taiwan Strait. The US has ascertained that in the future, China will inevitably become involved in intense competition with several minilaterals, which will deplete China's strategic resources to the limit. The idea of alliance strategy, which runs throughout the overall US strategy for global hegemony, is in essence "to make allies or quasi-allies take more responsibility, with the US playing an integrative, dominant, and cohesive role."1
The US has concluded that China is "the only competitor with both the intent to reshape the international order and, increasingly, the economic, diplomatic, military, and technological power to do it."2 Based on this perception, the Biden administration has intensified its strategic competition with China, formed the "Indo-Pacific Economic Framework" (IPEF) with a focus on curbing China's influence, and promoted "techno-democracies," aiming to rally more countries with industrial and supply chains to build a "small yard, high fence" against China. Meanwhile, in order to gain an upper hand in its strategic competition with China, the US has stepped up its efforts to build minilateral frameworks in the Asia-Pacific region, aiming to create a more flexible and intertwined system of alliances and partnerships.
The US created the US-Australia-Japan Trilateral Security Dialogue (TSD) in 2001 and launched the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) among the US, Japan, India, and Australia based on TSD in 2004. But it was not until Donald Trump's term in office that the Quad finally worked its "magic." However, the marginal effect of Quad has not been particularly evident due to various factors.
In order to make up for the weaknesses of the Quad, the US rushed to assemble another regional group dubbed the "Squad," which included Australia, Japan, and the Philippines, and conducted its first joint maritime exercise in the South China Sea on April 7, 2024. According to estimates by several US and European think tanks, the "Squad" is overtaking the Quad in importance, and may in the future constitute one of the two core pillars of the US "Indo-Pacific Strategy," in tandem with AUKUS.
Furthermore, several Asia-Pacific minilaterals have quickly grown in prominence in recent years and have garnered greater attention. Kent E. Calder, Director of the Edwin O. Reischauer Center for East Asian Studies at Johns Hopkins University, noted that a series of strategic triangles, including that of the US-Japan-Republic of Korea (ROK) and the US-Japan-Philippines, "are really the core of US foreign policy now."
The difficulties with traditional multilateralism are leading to a renewed focus on minilateralism by the international community.3 Compared with bilateral or multilateral relations, minilateral relations have greater influence and lower costs for aligning interests, which makes it easier and more efficient to reach a consensus and make decisions. However, the minilateralist approach has become the core of the US diplomatic strategy to implement containment and encirclement against China. AUKUS, the US-Japan-ROK, the US-Japan-Philippines, and other minilaterals are even keener to promote the "Three-Sea Linkage" strategy to restructure the First Island Chain in a bid to blockade China.
The US has also pressed NATO to deepen its relations with the Asia-Pacific minilaterals to support its implementation of a two-front containment strategy against China. In particular, the "Indo-Pacific Four" (IP4), consisting of Japan, the ROK, Australia, and New Zealand, have been repeatedly invited to attend the NATO summit. Back on September 26, 2022, the North Atlantic Council announced that it had accepted the request of the ROK government to designate its embassy to Belgium as the country's mission to NATO. These four countries, currently tagged as "partners across the globe" by NATO, are closely cooperating with NATO now. Among them, Japan, the ROK, and Australia are each engaging with NATO through their respective Individually Tailored Partnership Programmes (ITPPs). New Zealand is in the process of finalizing an ITPP.
The US has also established a quadrilateral group named I2U2 with India, Israel, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). Washington's initial strategic vision was to promote a close linkage between I2U2 and the Quad to counter the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Therefore, I2U2 was initially deemed to be a companion project to the Quad. With this in hand, the Biden administration sought to integrate forces in the Asia-Pacific region and the Middle East to contain China's influence in both regions.
On October 18, 2021, the foreign ministers of the I2U2 member countries held a virtual meeting, and I2U2's first summit was held virtually on July 14, 2022. According to Kabir Taneja, fellow with the Strategic Studies Program at the Observer Research Foundation of India, the quadrilateral mechanism in West Asia suggests that India-US cooperation has progressed further and the two quadrilateral mechanisms in the East and the West can reinforce each other to provide a comprehensive counterbalance to China's influence.
AUKUS Takes the Stage.
AUKUS was established on September 15, 2021. In view of its motivation and strategic environment at its formation, AUKUS is fundamentally aimed at containing China and is, in essence, a potential military alliance against China.4 AUKUS, as an important geostrategic tool created by the US, was formed to resurrect "insular principles" globally and build the most elite minilateral security framework by joining hands with the UK and Australia, the two "insular countries" that are most similar to the US in terms of their strategic goals and conditions.5 This is why the US Deputy Secretary of State Kurt Campbell called the AUKUS arrangement "the most important strategic innovation of this period."
The AUKUS framework features the so-called Pillar I and Pillar II. Pillar I is for the US and UK to "support Australia in acquiring its first conventionally armed, nuclear-powered submarine fleet." To this end, Australia scrapped the 90 billion AUD (approximately 69.9 billion USD) submarine deal it had entered with France in 2019. Pillar II involves development of cyber capabilities, artificial intelligence (AI), autonomous underwater vehicles, and long-range hypersonic missiles.
Nuclear-powered submarine cooperation is at the core of AUKUS. Given that it involves the transfer of large quantities of weapons-grade highly enriched uranium (HEU) and exploits the loopholes regarding military nuclear propulsion devices, it heavily damages the three growing nuclear non-proliferation paradigms, namely, military nuclear propulsion device transfers, dual-use item control, and nuclear breakout time.6 Therefore, China maintains that AUKUS cooperation on nuclear-powered submarines "constitutes serious nuclear proliferation risks, brings negative impact to the international nuclear non-proliferation regime, provokes arms race and impairs peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region."7
The US also consistently leverages Taiwan to facilitate the development of minilaterals such as AUKUS. Campbell made a rare linkage between Taiwan and AUKUS, saying that new submarine capabilities would "enhance peace and stability" in the Taiwan Strait. It was reported that on April 8 this year, the so-called "navy chief" of Taiwan, Tang Hua, had a secret meeting with US chief of naval operations Lisa Franchetti in Washington, in regard to the US Joint Island Defense Concept, which aims to enhance Taiwan's military strength within the First Island Chain.
Since its establishment, AUKUS has been reaching out to other countries in the region, especially Japan. On February 18, 2024, Australian Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Defense Richard Marles said that Australia was keen to see Japan collaborate with the AUKUS security partnership and that Japan was a "place of innovation" and was "at the cutting edge of technology." "I think it is natural that we would be talking about a greater level of cooperation between the three countries—US, UK, and Australia—and Japan, in terms of joint collaborations going forward," he added. On April 8, the defense ministers of the AUKUS member states issued a joint statement, saying that they were considering cooperation with Japan under AUKUS Pillar II.
In fact, as early as 2022, the US, UK, and Australia held informal talks with Japan about its participation in AUKUS. Taro Aso, Vice President of the Liberal Democratic Party of Japan (LDP), even made a high-profile statement that Japan should join AUKUS during his visit to Australia in 2023.
For Japan, participation in AUKUS will help enhance its security cooperation with the US, UK, and Australia and make it more crucial in the US Asia-Pacific minilateral mechanism. However, it will also affect Japan's normal exchanges with China and other Asia-Pacific countries.
Although Japan is not officially recognized as a member of AUKUS, bilateral security cooperation between Japan and the US, UK, and Australia has been progressing. In particular, following the signing of the Japan-Australia Reciprocal Access Agreement (RAA) in 2022 and the Japan-UK RAA in 2023, the Japan-UK and Japan-Australia bilateral interactions clearly exhibit the characteristics of quasi-military alliances. Therefore, for Japan, this is actually a form of indirect participation in AUKUS.
It can be predicted that Japan's engagement in AUKUS would be a step-by-step process. However, AUKUS is a military alliance with China as a strategic target, and, therefore, any form of engagement in AUKUS would mean treating China as a security antagonist. On April 8, 2024, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Mao Ning pointed out, "We oppose relevant countries cobbling together exclusive groupings and stoking bloc confrontation. Japan needs to earnestly draw lessons from history and stay prudent on military and security issues."
In late August 2023, the UK House of Commons issued a report saying that Japan and the ROK should be invited to join AUKUS. On April 23, 2024, Bonnie Jenkins, US Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security, said that since the beginning of AUKUS, the US President and trilateral leaders had been clear in their intent to engage others in Pillar II advanced capability projects, and Japan was the first to be consulted. On May 1, 2024, the sixth ROK-Australia Foreign and Defense Ministers' (2+2) Meeting was held in Melbourne, where both sides explored possible ROK engagement in AUKUS. Canada and New Zealand are also recognized as potential AUKUS partners.8
US "Extreme Competition" Strategy via Minilateral Mechanism in Asia-Pacific
Currently, the US is practicing an asymmetric strategy of competition, i.e., taking whatever measures possible to weaken China's strength (limiting China's ability to transmute its strength into the power that influences the regional and global order).9 While the Biden administration prefers "extreme competition" with China without resorting to military conflict, but such an extreme version of competition is probably only an inch away from conflict. Nowadays, "extreme competition" is reflected in the increasingly cross-domain nature of the US-led minilaterals in the Asia-Pacific, with the aim of advancing policy coordination among allies and partners across various sectors, including economy, security, and high technology, overstretching the concept of national security and ideologizing agendas in various fields, and pushing forward the cross-domain competition against China.
The US not only employs the Asia-Pacific minilateral mechanism to shape and solidify its allies' perception of China as a hostile country, but also repeatedly spreads negative rhetoric to denigrate China. What's more, under the minilateral mechanism, the US constantly exercises maximum pressure on China by intertwining and stoking all the concerns on such issues as the Taiwan question, the Korean Peninsula issue, the Sino-Japanese frictions, and the Sino-Indian border tensions, amongst other focal issues. Additionally, the US imposes "hard" containment measures on China under the pretense of "soft" security issues. For example, recently, there has been strong support from the US for the Philippines regarding territorial disputes in the South China Sea, creating obstacles for China's efforts to promote regional peace. The escalation of the US hegemonic strategy in the region is unprecedentedly calling for and pushing China to maintain its strategic focus and necessary anti-hegemony capacities in the face of challenges.
Meanwhile, following the ongoing expansion of the US Asia-Pacific minilateral mechanism, the pressure on relevant countries to take sides has risen exponentially, which also exerts a major impact on China's process of modernization. In this regard, China needs to maintain strategic patience and focus, ensuring accurate, in-depth, and objective analysis and judgment of the unfolding situation, and be well-prepared with strategic planning and positioning while adopting a multipronged approach to respond firmly.
The most effective way for Beijing to resist the US Asia-Pacific minilaterals is for China to keep building up its composite national strength and deepen its reform and opening up further in preparation for its accession to the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), which is as important as China's entry into the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001. With the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) coming into full effect, China officially submitted its application to join the CPTPP on September 16, 2021, and has been actively promoting the establishment of a free trade area (FTA) with Japan and the ROK. This is the necessary path for responding to US "extreme competition"—leveraging reform to drive development and seizing opportunities through opening up. Furthermore, for the greater good of the whole world, China would also remain committed to building a community with a shared future for mankind, now through the practical framework of the BRI, contributing to global modernization that foreshadows peaceful development, mutually beneficial cooperation, and prosperity for all.
1. Fan Wang, "US Hegemony Strategy Based on the Idea of Superiority and Its Limitations," China International Studies, no. 6 (2023): 35-55, https://www.cssn.cn/gjgc/gjgc_gcld/202401/t20240112_5728054.shtml.
2. The White House, National Security Strategy of the United States of America, October 12, 2022, https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/Biden-Harris-Administrations-National-Security-Strategy-10.2022.pdf.
3. Rajeswari Rajagopalan, "A Quad for the Middle East?," ORF, October 22, 2021, https://www.orfonline.org/research/a-Quad-for-the-middle-east/.
4. Zhiyong Li, "Progress, Essence, and Strategic Implications of AUKUS," International Cooperation Center, March 1, 2023, https://www.icc.org.cn/trends/mediareports/1507.html.
5. Peng Wang and Jie Yan, "The Geostrategic Logic of the US Constructing AUKUS," Contemporary American Review, no. 1 (2022): 79-100, 125.
6. Bin Li and Xiang Li, "How Does the AUKUS Nuclear Submarine Cooperation Change the International Nuclear Non-Proliferation Norms," Journal of International Security Studies, no. 4 (May 2023): 3-28.
7. Song Li, "True Multilateralism Is the Answer to Maintaining the NPT Regime," transcript of speech delivered at the IAEA Board of Governors meeting, Vienna, March 9, 2023, http://vienna.china-mission.gov.cn/eng/hyyfy/202303/t20230310_11038635.htm.
8. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Mao Ning's Regular Press Conference on April 8, 2024, April 8, 2024, https://www.mfa.gov.cn/eng/xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/2511_665403/202404/t20240408_11277991.html.
9. Wang, "US Hegemony Strategy."
Please note: The above contents only represent the views of the author, and do not necessarily represent the views or positions of Taihe Institute.
This article is from the May issue of TI Observer (TIO), which zooms in on new developments of those minilaterals in the Asia-Pacific and examines how these changes will redefine strategic dynamics and the security situation in the region. If you are interested in knowing more about the May issue, please click here:
http://www.taiheinstitute.org/UpLoadFile/files/2024/5/31/1327268243b64df50-7.pdf
——————————————
ON TIMES WE FOCUS.
Should you have any questions, please contact us at public@taiheglobal.org
© 2013-2021 Taihe Institute (TI) . All rights reserved. Taihe Institute (TI) .京ICP备16023694号-1
Privacy Policy丨Terms of Service
Contact Us: public@taiheglobal.org
