TAIHE: Ever since the term BRICS was coined, it has seemingly been deployed to refer to a loose economic cooperation, as opposed to a particular and unified political bloc with an agenda. With the BRICS expansion to 11 members at the group’s 15th summit in late August, do you think it is a signal that BRICS countries are going to be more united or diversified?
DR. BRIAN WONG: Great question. I think the expansion of the BRICS is an inexorable trend that is unlikely to halt in the short to medium term, especially with Turkey and Nigeria likely to join the next round of negotiations. Yet the future is not all rosy for the disparate countries. BRICS countries must figure out a way of navigating the fine balance between breadth and coverage, as well as solidarity and coherence. Finding ways to resolve differences among themselves will be of pivotal importance.
On the one hand, it is clear that BRICS countries have indeed agreed on several important issues. For one, BRICS arose from a push for greater leadership by powerful regional and international players that had conventionally been lumped in with the Global South. Respecting each other's sovereignty is a pivotal normative commitment, at least as expressed by member states – though the extent to which this principle has been in fact upheld remains to be see. Many of the BRICS also see the glaring hypocrisy in the moral compass of the West and the Global North as a major issue.
However, the fact that some among BRICS countries have expressed reservations about Russia’s actions in Ukraine, and that China, Saudi Arabia, and Brazil, among others, have sought to play a role in mediating the ongoing crisis, does suggest that BRICS countries do not see eye to eye regarding the ongoing war in Ukraine. Indeed, going forward, BRICS states must not tolerate and abet double standards among their own members. A true deepening of ties will require alignment on policy-making processes and guiding principles, as well as the shared interest sustained by governments of countries in Latin America, Africa, and South-East Asia – particularly those who are in fact craving an additional platform and a greater say against the backdrop of today's hegemonic global institutions, dominated by powers who may not welcome newcomers.
Despite all the positive vision, ideology, and rhetoric emanating from the group, the extent to which BRICS can bring concrete improvements and empowerment to its member states remains to be seen. Argentina faces impending election of a far-right leader; Iran and Saudi Arabia remain entrenched in religiously motivated divides and sectarian resentment that has been paved over, but not resolved, by mediation efforts from Beijing. There is much that stands in the way of true unity and closer alignment between BRICS member states.
Yet all these disparities are part and parcel of BRICS being an open-minded, open-ended, and therefore heterogeneous project in progress. Such differences, at their core, have not hampered the potential for BRICS to grow and cultivate stronger bilateral economic and strategic ties. It’s easy to look down upon developing countries and brand them as ineffectual losers in this proverbial game of Zbigniew Brzezinski's “The Grand Chessboard”.
TAIHE: You have made a very good point. In Chinese philosophy, we are firmly wedded to this celebration of diversity, 和而不同. The BRICS countries have seemingly rallied around a shared distaste and dislike for the West, with the Western press seeing them as a rival to the Western powers, and Russia seeking diplomatic alliances through the expansion of the bloc. Yet it also appears that India’s stance is pro-West. What do you make of this all?
DR. BRIAN WONG: Look, there are several ways of looking at how the BRICS bloc relates to the West. The first view is the BRICS is an actively antagonistic coalition of countries that seek to rival and defend themselves against the US. The second and alternative reading is that the BRICS is merely a complementary, supplementary institution that goes along with the Global North… and that it does not fundamentally contravene or stand in opposition to the Global North – no grievances. I would say that neither of the two excessively unrefined and simplistic narratives makes much sense to me. On one hand, this interpretation ignores the view, as raised recently by President Lula at the BRICS meeting, that Brazil still has a good relationship with its Western partners. Closer and deepening ties between India and the European Union, as well as the push for greater free trade between the Indian Subcontinent and other developed countries and regions, are signs that India does not and will not intend to decouple or detach itself from the West anytime soon. Even the new members, such as UAE or Saudi Arabia, are quite firmly planted within the Western energy trade and supply chains at large.
I don’t think any BRICS member will object to the view that BRICS membership grants greater strategic flexibility and leeway vis-à-vis the West. It is true that the economic grouping has and will continue to place pressure on policymakers in Washington, London, and Brussels to come up with alternative means of courting the Global South. Yet it is vital that we appreciate how diverse and heterogeneous the views of BRICS members are. We cannot possibly conclude that the bloc as a whole is anti-Western and committed to a vindictive agenda against some of its largest trading partners. A tit-for-tat agenda with the West would be a self-destructive exercise that would hurt the BRICS badly. Yes, the world is becoming more multi-polar, but this is not a reason for countries to ignore the laws of trade and basic economics. Fundamentally, BRICS is not an anti-Western, confrontational institution designed to repudiate or counterbalance against all presence and influence of the West.
TAIHE: On another note, Indian scholars believe that the BRICS are being used by China and Russia, and suggest that it is difficult to build trust between the BRICS members, to smooth over long-standing rifts and skepticism, such that the BRICS can play a greater role in the international community. So how do you see China’s relationship with India?
DR. BRIAN WONG: I think the crux of the world tomorrow rests with the Sino-Indian relationship of today. China and India are shaping up to be the most prominent, not just the most populous, countries in global politics in the long run. Don't get me wrong – there are many points of contention and divergence between China and India. For one, there are the disputes and flare-ups along the Line of Actual Control (LAC), controversies and contestations over territorial control in Kashmir, as well as competition between national business champions. Prime Minister Narendra Modi, as a slick and effective political mind, has implemented significant nationalistic, protectionist, and anti-Chinese business measures over the past few years, including banning TikTok, which really was aimed at protecting India’s domestic political and digital economy, as well as a slew of other companies. With the Quad now in place, India clearly feels that it is in a position to call for and exert greater influence in Southeast Asia and the region.
India and China also do not agree entirely on the issue of Russia and the ongoing war in Ukraine, despite the former being by far a more avid economic and security-military partner to Russia than China. Russia has been incredibly shrewd, for the most part, in playing Beijing against New Delhi to squeeze both parties for maximum economic aid and support. The events unfolding in Ukraine right now are testament to both the underlying fundamentals and limits to the relationship between Russia, China, and India. The Kremlin has thus far managed to balance the two international players with aplomb, relying upon India’s purchasing of oil and energy from Russia, and the continued economic and financial support from China.
Despite his flamboyant eloquence and exceptional ability to mobilize the masses through populist nationalism, Modi has sought to be as dexterous and strategically ambivalent as possible in conducting his international affairs and foreign policy. Modi has been very careful in saying he was not systemically opposed or antagonistic towards China, as well as positing that China and India can share and co-habit a more multipolar world order. Yet Modi has also affirmed that he sees China as a risk factor, thereby stoking the concerns of Indian nationalists who view Chinese actions with engrained suspicion. It is indeed reasonable for us to have renewed doubts about the strength or even durability of the Russian government, as well as its ability to continually play both sides internationally – yet this should and must be separated from the question of how India is likely to react.
With that said, I don’t want you to walk away feeling that the Sino-Indian relationship is inherently doomed. There exists much goodwill between China and India, especially on a provincial-state and municipal-local level. There is definitely some interest from both sides in finding a more sustainable modus vivendi between the two powers. There are three urgent tasks that must be resolved as soon as possible.
Firstly, both parties must deeply understand, study, and investigate the political and foreign policy making processes of one another – thereby developing a genuine understanding and grasp of the modes of governance of the other – to broaden and deepen the intellectual horizons and responsiveness to facts of policymakers, businesses, and individuals in both countries.
Secondly, there are some issues in the relationship between India and China for which clear red lines must be drawn, laid out, and accepted. Only by the two powers agreeing to disagree, can they agree on a wider range of instrumentally important areas.
Finally, both countries should recognize that commercial relations and trade can be win-win. The inflow and outflow of goods and services serve the interests of both sides. On the other hand, the protectionism, tariffs, restrictions and other legal provisions and measures are not in the interests of both sides. Both India and China would benefit from reforming trade flows and opening up to promising FDI.
These are the points and suggestions concerning how both India and China can improve their bilateral relations.
TAIHE: That's very impressive, and applicable to many bilateral relations, especially when given the backdrop of ascending nationalism and protectionism. What role can China play?
DR. BRIAN WONG: I believe that we must actively undertake Track-II dialogue initiatives and diplomatic exchanges. In relation to Sino-Indian diplomacy and exchanges, we, as the private or academic sector, bear the responsibility to significantly strengthen the quality and depth of Track-II diplomacy.
TAIHE: Russia is stuck in a war, and BRICS countries clearly hold different views towards the eruption of the war. Yet we also witnessed a joint statement given during the BRICS Foreign Ministers Meeting on June 1. The statement suggested that the ministers recognized the impact on the world economy from unilateral approaches in breach of international law, and that the situation was complicated further by unilateral economic coercion methods. How do you interpret this claim concerning unilateral coercion, especially given that Iran is joining the BRICS?
DR. BRIAN WONG: The statement addresses two aspects of the sanctions: unilateral sanctions, and financial isolation. The former is aimed at delegitimizing particular regimes, whilst the latter is aimed at curbing and eliminating the impact of certain countries on the global financial system and the ability to root them swiftly and effectively out of the market when push comes to shove. I think and hope BRICS can play a role in mediating peace in the Ukrainian war, finding a reasonable compromise that takes into account both sides’ key baseline interests, thereby giving rise to a mutually beneficial solution.
On both moral and perceptual grounds, the BRICS must commit to the view that they should be vigilant that international law cannot be violated simply because geopolitical interests are threatened or attacked, and that if the law is violated, it will be a violation of rights of citizens of member states. Such violations cannot be easily defended or lightly excused. Other countries cannot unilaterally sanction other countries without the authorization of multilateral institutions and the full membership of the UN Security Council and General Assembly. As such, when the West accuses China of allegedly participating in currency manipulation, sabotaging international systems, trade espionage and industrial theft, or knowledge theft, I would like to remind all parties involved that one hand cannot clap. I think what's important here is that the West must look at themselves in the mirror and say, “Aren't we also guilty, if anything more blatantly, of the same violations – protectionism, trade weaponization, institutional sabotage – that we’re accusing other countries of?”
Of course, we need to push back against unjustified wars and invasions of military aggression, but we must also be willing to speak up against those who seek to transform the global financial and capital markets into their own political battering ram.
TAIHE: Thank you and I think we’ve got enough regarding China, India and Russia. Let's come back to another part, South Africa. South Africa invited all the African countries to participate in this (BRICS) Summit. How does the cooperation between the BRICS and the African continent at the 2023 Summit to liberalize trade differ from AGOA or any other form of global platform for cooperation?
DR. BRIAN WONG: This is a great question. I think there are two levels to answering this question.
Firstly, we must reflect on the role of South Africa in BRICS and the relationship between Africa and other BRICS countries. My point is this, if BRICS is indeed what we could characterize as rapidly emerging economies with vast economic potential, then Africa is in many ways the core constituent and heart of this very movement, this selectorate, when it comes to a shift of the global nexus of power away from the Global North, and gradually towards the Global South.
Secondly, we should also think about South Africa's role in the BRICS. Here, I'd say it serves two critical functions. The first is as among the primary economic engines on the African continent, alongside Egypt and Nigeria as well. The second, is as a source of young and by-and-large increasingly middle-class demographics.
TAIHE: Now, do you have something to wrap up with? Any comments on what kind of role China can play in BRICS, especially when it comes to BRICS’ expanding its economic influence and membership?
DR. BRIAN WONG: China is an important pillar of a multi-polar world, and the BRICS countries are important flag bearers for the shifting tectonics of our times. They comprise a sizeable and respectable population and segment in the Global South. And it’s high time we started to think about the world beyond the Global North.
