United States Midterm Elections: Implications on US Grand Strategy of China Containment

December 16, 2022

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Introduction

The populist phrase U.S.-China competition got impetus soon after Donald J. Trump assumed the office of the US President in 2017. His rhetoric against China was quite distinct during his election campaign, which earned him a great election victory. Thereafter, to formalize his “Tough on China” policy, the National Security Strategy of 2018 specifically added a portion on major powers’ competition with China to change China’s behavior. His four years saw tumultuous U.S.-China relations as the U.S. unleashed a trade war and often undiplomatic rhetoric against the Chinese system of governance, Hong Kong, Taiwan, and several other human rights issues contrary to the facts and ground realities. However, it was expected that President Biden would take a rational and pragmatic approach toward China. While he has demonstrated a less rhetorical approach to China as compared to his predecessor, the National Security Strategy of 2022 reinforces the unrealistic competition with China. President Biden has himself uttered on several occasions his desire to be “tough on China” as such behavior would help him in local constituencies. It can therefore be discerned that both Democrats and Republicans have adopted an identical anti-China policy. This opinion article analyzes the implications of US midterm elections on U.S.-China policy, comprehensively examines China’s competition and containment saga, and suggests viable policy options for enduring relations between the U.S. and China and overall regional peace and stability. 

 

 

United States Midterm Elections: Implications on U.S.-China Policy

The outcome of the midterm elections has helped President Biden with improved stature domestically and globally. No change is expected in China policy. Instead, it would rather empower President Biden for adopting a more aggressive approach. Despite the change of faces and parties in the past more than six years, the anti-China policy has been a constant in US policy circles. The controversial visit by U.S. House Speaker Nancy Pelosi to Taiwan on August 2, 2022 was a well-planned election bid for domestic audiences, which created unwanted diplomatic and military tension between U.S. and China. It, however, played a role in Democrats’ midterm election results. During ASEAN Summit in Cambodia, President Biden in a reply to a question by a journalist on November 13, 2022, stressed that the U.S. wants competition and not conflict with China. While the tone was a little softer, the content was almost the same. The landmark meeting between President Xi Jinping and President Biden on the sidelines of the G-20 Summit in Bali on November 14, 2022 was momentous, especially against the backdrop of the successful completion of the 20^th National Congress of the CPC in China and the US midterm elections of November 2022. While both the presidents showed great optimism during the meeting, hoping for constructive engagement, and avoiding conflict, however, the track record proves otherwise, as the U.S. has generally demonstrated a demonizing posture and tried to bring conflictual issues to the forefront to advance US hegemonic agenda and China containment policy. A mere change of faces and parties through elections in the U.S. has not helped in the change of US policy toward China.

 

 

Strategic Construct of China Containment

In the recent past, the U.S. has begun to recognize the strategic importance of Southeast Asia by realizing the need for a “Pivot to Asia” or “Rebalance.” Hillary Clinton, former US Secretary of State described this region as the “fulcrum” of developing a regional economic and security architecture. Another important aspect is that US arms sales and technology transfers are assumed to be essential factors for maintaining a balance of power and dissuading China from cooperative engagement. Washington has indicated that it does not recognize China’s sovereignty over several islands including reefs in the Nansha Islands  by stating that for the sake of retaining hard-earned freedom of navigation, the U.S. Navy will endure operating here. This policy shift implies the shifting of diplomatic, military, and economic resources to the region from other parts of the world. In Southeast Asia, a dominant manifestation of the pivot includes developing relations with these countries and reviving close US links with the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia, and Thailand. The previous administration of President Obama also elevated defense cooperation with most of the regional countries with an emphasis on port and basing of combat ships in Southeast Asia. The pivot had several constituents: mainly shifting of US foreign policy orientation from Afghanistan and the Middle East to the Asia Pacific (later refined as Indo-Pacific), relocation of naval assets and new dispositions of U.S. Marine Corps to other locations, and forging treaties with allies and partners. It elucidated the plans for the military relocations as “modernizing basing arrangements with traditional allies in Northeast Asia while enhancing our presence in Southeast Asia and the Indian Ocean.” These activities reinforce deterrence, help to build the capacity and competence of the U.S., allies, and partner forces for internal and external defense, strengthen alliance cohesion and increase US influence in the region.

 

The US “Pivot to Asia” strategy, military posturing, and basing of its forces in China’s near abroad in the Indo-Pacific region have contributed to a large extent to creating mistrust, instability, and anxiety in China. That unprovoked US military posturing involving a large number of allies was aiming at containing China. Such developments have not helped in building trust at bilateral and multilateral levels, and it is widely perceived that Obama administration’s “Pivot to Asia” has interrupted the course of joint development and needlessly strewed dissatisfaction by bringing the conflicts to the center and creating haze among the neighbors regarding China’s future intentions, despite China’s outreach and assurances of settling disputes through dialogue and peaceful means. It is also worth mentioning that the Air-Sea Battle element of “Pivot to Asia” is offensive in outlook and manifestation and perceived to be directed toward China. The frequently discussed preservation of hard-earned freedom of navigation by containing surveillance of China undermines trust and harms China’s core security concerns, and impinges on China’s sovereignty. With above stated empirical evidence, it can be concluded that the “Pivot to Asia” appears to be a self-fulfilling prophecy of the U.S. by depicting China as a competitor rather than a partner in regional and global affairs and keeping the trumpet of “China-threat” theory alive, thus retaining legal grounds of enormous US military presence in the region. The aspects of “China containment” are aptly exemplified by offensive military doctrines, posturing, and joint military exercises by the U.S. and its regional allies.

 

 

Examining the U.S.-China Policy in the Context of National Security Strategy (NSS) 2018 and 2022

The US NSS 2018 brought a fundamental shift in US policy towards China, where after almost two decades, the U.S. announced China competition and containment as an explicit national security priority. President Biden’s long-awaited NSS 2022 even advanced the notion of competition with China by building an alliance of like-minded countries of the Indo-Pacific. The graphical analysis highlights China in US policy calculus, where the emphasis is on China containment by creating a set of alliances of regional countries ready to embrace US obligations. 

 

Some important excerpts of US NSS 2022 will give a clear picture of US future policies on China and the wider Indo-Pacific region. 

“We are in the midst of a strategic competition to shape the future of the international order.”

“We have deepened our core alliances in Europe and the Indo-Pacific.” 

“We are doing more to connect our partners and strategies across regions through initiatives like our security partnership with Australia and the United Kingdom (AUKUS).” 

“We are with the European Union, the Indo-Pacific Quad, the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework, and the Americas Partnership for Economic Prosperity.”

“The People’s Republic of China harbors the intention and, increasingly, the capacity to reshape the international order in favor of one that tilts the global playing field to its benefit, even as the United States remains committed to managing the competition between our countries responsibly.”

“The PRC, by contrast, is the only competitor with both the intent to reshape the international order and, increasingly, the economic, diplomatic, military, and technological power to advance that objective.”

“The PRC’s assertive behavior has caused other countries to push back and defend their sovereignty, for their own, legitimate reasons. The PRC also retains common interests with other countries, including the United States, because of various interdependencies on climate, economics, and public health.”¹

 

Other China containment strategies include the US Indo-Pacific Strategy, US Indo-Pacific Economic Framework, AUKUS, QUAD, and bilateral US engagements with countries of the Indo-Pacific region. US overt support to alliance partners in the region is also contributing to instability and trust deficit between China and the U.S. Notwithstanding US firm partnerships with the ROK, Japan, and several other regional countries are understandable and much appreciated, US security treaty and enormous arms sale to Taiwan, Japan, and the Philippines with offensive posturing demonstrated during joint military exercises with the U.S., witnessed as regular yearly feature, are considered as China-specific, which degenerates prospects of enduring stability and trust building. The visit by US House Speaker Nancy Pelosi to Taiwan was aimed at provoking China to seek justification for the military standoff while getting a favorable response from US voters during midterm elections. 

 

 

US Over-Commitment to Alliance Obligations

To keep the “China-threat” theory alive, the U.S., with help of allies is propagating China’s peaceful development as a threat. The U.S. professes that the foremost challenge the nations of the Indo-Pacific region face is the emergence of China as a dominant military power and its efforts to continue to control Taiwan, the South China Sea, and the Diaoyu Islands. There is also a threat that Beijing will continue to subvert the political systems of countries in the Indo-Pacific region. Therefore, the countries which can play a significant role in this region besides the U.S. are Japan, South Korea, India, and Australia. The Indo-Pacific strategy, therefore, relies on strengthening relations with these countries. The priority areas are: improvement in defense cooperation, reducing external military threats, promoting economic assistance, and looking at threatening environmental issues such as ozone depletion and greenhouse gas emissions. The key actors identified to counter the Chinese challenge along with the U.S. are India, Japan, Australia, South Korea, Indonesia, and Taiwan, while Singapore, the Philippines, and Vietnam are also significant. The US Indo-Pacific strategy emphasizes “modernized alliances, flexible partnerships, including an empowered ASEAN, a leading India, a strong and reliable Quad, and an engaged Europe; economic partnership; new US defense, diplomatic, development, and foreign-assistance resources; sustained focus on and commitment to the region at all levels of the U.S. government.” The empirical evidence amply highlights that the U.S. along with regional countries embarked on the containment policy of China at multiple levels of engagement and incentives. The U.S., India, Japan, Australia, South Korea, the Philippines, Indonesia, and Singapore are ready to embrace the new assignment, while keeping a balanced posture towards China.  

 

 

Recommended Strategy for China – Avoiding Confrontation and Contributing to Enduring Peace and Stability

1. Trust Building Between China-U.S. and Regional Countries

Both the U.S. and China must develop a comprehensive understanding of the relationship following the principles of “managing differences for common development,” avoiding confrontation, and taking steps for further trust. Against this backdrop, the following measures are recommended.  

· The first aspect is that Chinese President Xi Jinping’s offer of building a “New Type of Major Power Relations” should be formalized and vigorously pursued.

· The second aspect is the constructive engagement with the U.S. to convince the United States of explicit commitment to removing the prevailing haze and perceived containment of China, and reassurance for the respect for China’s territorial integrity and national sovereignty as well as its political system. US over-commitment to alliances in East Asia should take contemplation of the sensitivities of non-allied countries to avoid a new cold war. 

· The third aspect is that China and the U.S. should refrain from demonizing each other and take measures to enhance communication on policies and actions to avoid misunderstanding. The use of media or press conferences to some extent has impacted negatively on bilateral relations. Therefore, dialogues and exchanges of education, positive assurances, and joint training in addressing non-traditional security threats should be formalized and implemented.

· It is also suggested that China should proactively engage with the regional countries, especially those which are vital for the US Indo-Pacific strategy, to keep communication lines open and also at a bilateral level involve in common development and investment projects.

 

2. Managing Tensions and Crises Situations

In the region of heightened tension, the following is recommended for managing crises arising due to perceived miscalculation by any side:

· The first and foremost aspect is the policy of robust engagement between China, the U.S., and regional countries at bilateral diplomatic and military levels to keep channels of communication open. Through military exchanges and joint military exercises, countries can be partners in major international issues concerning non-traditional security. The template of the anti-piracy cooperation in the Gulf of Aden is a good starting point that is recommended to be capitalized on and enhanced for mutual benefit and the world at large.

· Secondly, enhancing bilateral cooperation on a host of global issues like the DPRK nuclear issue, the Iranian nuclear issue, non-traditional security issues like disaster relief operations, anti-piracy operations, etc., counter-terrorism and transnational crimes, cyber-security, environmental challenges, the steadiness of international economic system and ensuring uninterrupted energy supplies. 

· Thirdly, conflict prevention, risk management, and mitigation. A few suggested measures are: establishing hotlines between the two militaries and formalizing the mechanism of notifying each other’s military maneuvers, major exercises, and routine training events for trust building and avoiding any miscalculations and stimulating better synchronization. 

 

3. Prioritizing the Completion of BRI-Related Projects

China-Laos high-speed rail has been hailed by the regional countries as it provides a template of cooperation on the regional integration prospects. Such engagements at bilateral levels with relevant countries in the Indo-Pacific region should be given priority for completion as they provide alternatives to the much-trumpeted US Indo-Pacific Economic Framework strategy. Another aspect is managing geopolitics on account of the debt burden and enhancing the Chinese sphere of influence. Capacity building of relevant countries in terms of skilled manpower, job creation, and management of those mega developmental projects with their human resource would make them stakeholders and indispensable partners.

 

4. Optimization of Multilateral Forums

The Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) is one such platform where 15 Indo-Pacific nations including China are its members. Most of the countries happen to be part of the U.S.-led alliance against China. Therefore, cooperative economic engagement would disincentivize any negative competition. China may also consider free trade agreements (FTAs) with the members of this grouping or any other regional countries willing to embrace the Chinese initiative. Additionally, regional organizations like ASEAN, the SCO, and BRICS, to name a few, should also be energized for economic engagement initiatives for the benefit of all countries through a model of win-win cooperation.

 

5. White Paper on China’s Cooperative Engagement Within the Region and Beyond

Along the lines of the White Paper on “Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)” or “China’s Peaceful Development,” it is suggested that a new White Paper on “China’s Regional Approach and Engagement” is long overdue. Such undertaking would alleviate any avenues of exploitation and misrepresentation by Western scholars on China’s role in regional and global affairs. Additionally, through various joint conferences, seminars, and media talks, China’s benign intentions should be projected. Otherwise, the Western influences on predicting the U.S.-China war and conflict, and portraying China as a hegemon would continue to gain wider acceptability, which is considered detrimental to China’s interests. 

 

6. Increasing China’s Soft Power

China is blessed with vast geography, a diverse population, 5,000-year-old civilization, and enormous potential for rich culture and traditions, and therefore, must pursue a proactive policy of demonstrating soft power in the countries of the Indo-Pacific. Chinese operas, cultural shows, TV programs, enhanced people-to-people contacts, and academic exchange programs are suggested to be a priority. Additionally, the visa regime should also be liberalized to attract more tourists from these countries. As it is well known, “seeing is believing.” Therefore, their visit to China is incentivized and facilitated. The strong friendship bond at the people level would help in forcing policymakers to take a cooperative course.

 

 

 

 

1. The White House, “National Security Strategy,” The White House, October 2022, https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/Biden-Harris-Administrations-National-Security-Strategy-10.2022.pdf

 

 

Note

Most analyses are based on the author’s own peer-reviewed published article on “USA’s Pivot to Asia: Cooperation or Containment – an intrusive analysis from realist perspective.”

Ishaque, W., Anjum, S., & Shah, S. J. (2017). USA’S PIVOT TO ASIA; COOPERATION OR CONTAINMENT-AN INTRUSIVE ANALYSIS FROM A REALIST PERSPECTIVE. Margalla Papers, 21(1).  

https://margallapapers.ndu.edu.pk/site/issue/view/12/6 page 254

 

 

 

 

This article is from the November issue of TI Observer (TIO), which is a monthly publication devoted to bringing China and the rest of the world closer together by facilitating mutual understanding and promoting exchanges of views. If you are interested in knowing more about the September issue, please click here:

http://www.taiheinstitute.org/Content/2022/11-30/1912145654.html

 

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